Interest on Claims in Receivership Proceedings by Clark, Ralph E
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 19 Issue 1 
1920 
Interest on Claims in Receivership Proceedings 
Ralph E. Clark 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons, Common Law Commons, and the Secured Transactions 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ralph E. Clark, Interest on Claims in Receivership Proceedings, 19 MICH. L. REV. 35 (1920). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol19/iss1/3 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
INTEREST ON CLAIMS IN RECEIVERSHIP 
PROCEEDINGS:!' 
INTEIU:ST ON UNSECUIU:D CLAIMS 
OUTSIDE the cases of receivership, the Supreme Court of the United States has said: 
"We reach the conclusion that whatever may have been 
the English and early American rule, the tendency in Vir-
ginia as elsewhere in this country, is to allow interest on con-
tracts to pay money from the date that the debt becomes 
due."1 
Interest is allowed as a matter of law in cases of contract or the 
unlawful detention of money.2 In the absence of statute the gen-
eral rule is that in actions for .tort the allowarice of interest is not 
an absolute right3-it rests in the discretion of the court or jury.' 
The rule generally announced governing the payment of. interest 
on claims in receivership proceedings may be briefly stated as 
follows:-5 
"As a general rule, after property of an insolvent passes 
into the hands of a receiver, interest is not allowed on claims 
against the funds. * * * The delay in distribution is the act 
of the law; it is a necessary incident to the settlement of the 
estate." 
This rule was laid down early in the history of receiverships, has 
been generally followed by courts ·of equity, and the substance of 
this rule has been incorporated in the bankruptcy statutes of Eng-
*By Ralph E. Clark, of the Cincinnati Bar, author of Cl.ARK ON~. 
1 Am. Iron Co. v. Seaboard Air Line (1913), 233 U. S. 261 at 26,5. 
'Lincoln v. Claflin (1868), 7 Wall. 132 at 139· 
'Drumm-Flato Commission Co. v. Edmisson (1907), 208 U.S. 534 at 539· 
'The Scotland (1885), n8 U. S. 507 at 518; Lincoln v. Claflin (1868), 
7 Wall. 132 at 139; Bates v. Dresser, March l, 1920, U. S. Supreme Court. 
•Thomas v. Western Car Co. (1893), 149 U.S. 95at n6; New York Trust 
Co. v. Detroit T. & I. Ry. (1918), 151 Fed. 514 at 519. 
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land and the United States. Various reasons have been given for 
the above rule. The Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors has said :6 
"No debt can arise against an insolvent estate in the hands 
of a receiver. From this principal comes the general rule 
that only claims as then existing can be recognized as obliga-
tions of the estate. For this reason interest cannot be allowed 
on claims after insolvency has been judicially declared." 
Judge William H. Taft, then of the Circuit Court of Appeals, 
Sixth District, in the case of Chemical National Bank v. Armstrong, 
16 U. S., App. 465, at page 535, says: 
"It will not do to say that the date fixed for stopping in-
terest on all claims is a mere matter of convenience in calcu-
lating which works no injury to anyone because all are treated 
alike. The creditor with a debt bearing 8% interest is very 
injuriously affected in comparison with the creditor whose 
debt bears but 4%.'' 
Lindley, L. J., in the case of In re Browne & Wingrove [1891], 
L. R 2 Q. B. D., 574 at 5$1, says: 
"The rule which prevents proof for future interest is not 
a positive enactment-it is rather a rule of conv~ience. In 
ordinary cases it produces no injustice.'' 
Mr. Justice Lamar in American Iron 'Co. v. Seaboard Air Line 
(1913) 233 U.S. 261 at 266 said: 
"And it is true as held in Tredegar Co. v. Seaboard Rail-
way, 183 Fed. Rep. 289, 290. That as a general rule, after 
property of an insolvent is in custodia legis, interest thereafter 
accruing is not allowed on debts payable out of the funds 
realized by sale of the property. But that is not because the 
claims had lost their interest bearing qualities during that 
period, but is a necessary and enforced rule of distribution, 
due to the fact that in case of receiverships the assets are 
generally insufficient to pay all debts in full. If all claims 
were of equal dignity and all bore the same rate of interest 
'Lippitt v. Thomas L. & T. Co. (1914), 88 Conn. 185 at 2o6, 90 Atl. 369. 
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from the date of the receivership to the date of fi_nal distribu-
tion, it would ·be immaterial whether the dividend was calcu-
lated on the basis of the principal alone, or of interest and 
principal combined. But some of the debts might carry a 
high rate and some a low rate, and hence, inequality would 
res~t in the payment of interest· which accrued during the 
delay incident to collecting and distributing the funds. As 
this delay was the act of the law, no one should thereby gain 
an advantage or suffer a loss. For that and like reasons, in 
case funds are not sufficient to pay claims of equal dignity, 
the distribution is made only on the basis of the principal 
debt. But that rule did not prevent the running of interest 
during receivership; and if, as a result of good fortune or 
good management, the estate proved sufficient to discharge 
the claims in full, interest as well as principal should be paid." 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile all these different 
statements made by courts of high authority. We agree with the 
statements made by Lindley, L. J., and Mr. Justice Lamar, just 
quoted. When a t'eceiver is appointed of the property of an insol-
vent, be he an individual or corpoi::ation-liens, charges and equities 
which existed ·before receivership are not chan{?:ed, altered or an-
nulled by reason of the receivership. Furthermore, if a claimant 
has a substantive right or claim against the individual or corporation 
before insolvency, this ~ubstantive right is not cancelled or annulled 
or divested by the receivership. A court of equity cannot change 
the contracts and substantive rights of a claimant which existed be-
fore receivership. If this is true; then it is difficult to conceive how 
a claimant's substantive right to interest against the insolvent in-
dividual or corporation cari ·be annulled or arrested at the time of 
appointment of receiver. When the Connecticut Supreme Court of 
Error says : "That no debt can arise against an insolvent estate in 
the hands of a receiver," we believe this court nas not stated tne Iaw 
correctly, if this court means that no obligation to pay"interest which 
existed before receivership continues after appointment of receiver_ 
It is true that after appointment of a receiver, no obligation can be 
initiated or created anew by the party whose property is in the hands 
of a receiver so as to bind such property. But it certainly cannot 
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be true that an obligation to pay interest ceases to be an obligation 
by the appointment of a receiver. The New York court in the case 
of Fera v. Wickham (18g2) 1 says: "By an assignment in trust for 
the assignor's creditors, what natural equities previously existed be-
come suspended by an intervention by the rights of· other creditors." 
Such a statement·we believe, is in violation of the fundamental prin-
ciples of equity, and is nof in accord with the most recent rulings of 
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the southern district of New York,8 
nor with the most recent rulings of the Supreme Court of the United 
States.11 We believe the rule stopping interest at time of appoint-
ment of receiver is a rule of convenience, and in most cases does 
work for an equitable distribution to creditors, but not in all cases. 
When a court of equity appoints a receiver of the property of an 
insolvent person or corporation for the purpose of distributing this 
property to creditors, the court appointing the receiver has deprived 
claimants of their ordinary legal and equitable remedies against this 
property. No levy, execution or attachment can be brought against 
the assets of the insolvent when they are in the hands of a receiver. 
The court of equity having deprived claimants of their ordinary 
remedies invites such claiJ;nants to submit such claims to a receiver 
or to a master for allowance and liquidation, or rejection, making 
proper provisions for the receiver's or master's findings to be re-
ported to the court for confirmation. It is the court's duty to dis-:-
tribute the assets equitably and ratably to claimants whose claims are 
properly presented and proved. The appointment of a receiver can-
not deprive a debt of its interest-bearing quality; neither can it . 
annul'the contract of the insolvent to pay interest. If there is enough 
property to go around, justice and the contractual rights of the 
claimants demand that interest should be carried down to the actual 
payment of the money.10 Therefore, to divide the property up equit-
T 135 N. Y. 223. See also People v. Am. Loan & T. Co. (1902), 172 N. Y 
371 at 378, when Vann, J., says: "'By law the creditor becomes the equitable 
owner of the assets and the administration of affairs is for their benefit 
as such." 
'Penn. Steel Co. v. N. Y. City Ry. Co. (1912), 198 N. Y. 721 at 742. 
•wm. Filene's Sons Co. v. Weed (1917), 245 U. S. 597. 
flLord Mansfield in Robinson v. Bland (176<>), 2 Burr. lo87; Blair v. ' 
Clayton Ent. Co. (1910), 9 Del. Ch. 98; Williams, Adm. v. Am. Bank (1842), 
4 Mete. 317 at 317. 
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ably and ratably if sufficient to go around, interest must be figured 
up to the time of distribution.11 If there is not sufficient property 
to go around, which is of course the case when insolvency takes 
place, then the only equitable and ratable distribution of the assets 
appears to us to be to figure interest according to contracts on claims 
up to the time of distribution, then declare such a· dividend as is pos-
sible on the amount of the claims, including interest.12 However, if 
all claims bear the same rate of interest, we can of course stop 
interest at time of appointment .of receiver or any other subsequent 
time, and the division would be equitable and ratable; but if one 
creditor has a debt bearing 8% interest, the stopping of interest at 
time of appointment of receiver may very injuriously affect him in 
comparison to the creditor whose debt bears but 4%. 
Although authorities without number may be found for stopping 
interest at time of appointment of receiver, nevertheless if it is 
necessary to calculate interest on all claims up to the time of dis-
tribution in order to make a truly equitable and ratable distribution, 
then we believe this ought and can be done without violating any 
positive usage and rule of equity. · 
INTSRF:S't ON sscuro:o CLAIMS 
A debtor when incurring his obligation to pay and giving security 
for· such obligation, generally but not 'always by contract, secures 
the payment ot interest as well as the prindpal of the debt. ·If he 
does so secure the payment of interest, the creditor who has a right 
· to hold or appropriate the security or collateral can hold or appropri-
ate it when default occurs of either interest or principal. If interest 
is so secured, then the creditor can not be compelled to relinquish his 
right to hold or appropriate the security until he has been paid both 
principal and all interest due up to the time he relinquished the secu-
rity. If the security is realized and he is not paid his debt in full. then 
:u. Cases of solvency. People v. Merchant's Trust Co. (1907), 187 N. Y. 
29J, 79 N. E. 1004; First Nat. Bank v. J. I. Campbell Co. (1go8), 52 Tex. 
Civ. App. 445, II4 S. W. 887. See Annotation I,. R. A. 1917 D., p. n66. 
12 B1air v. Clayton Ent. Co. (1910), 9 Del. Ch. 95 at g8; Re Murray, As-
signee of Commercial Ins. Co. (1836), 6 Paige 204; Amer. Iron Co.· v. Sea-
board Air Line (1913), 233 U.S. 261 at 266. · 
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bis actual claim against the debtor insolvent is the original claim and 
all interest up to date of presenting ms clai•, less the actual amount 
realized by his security. In other words, out of the security or se-
curities if they are more than enough to pay the secured creditor, he 
must be paid his full claim with interest to date of payment before 
any balance can be turned over to the receiver. for distribution to 
other creditors.13 If interest on the creditor's claim is not subject to 
lien, then the question arises, . shall interest be calculated on the 
~editor's secured claim w~en the collateral or security is realized 
and proceeds applied toward payment of the secured creditors 
claim? If the creditor has no such lien covering his interest, then 
he can not receive from the realization of his collaterals a sum 
greater than his original debt, less interest. However, after he has 
realized his securities, he still has a claim against the insolvent for 
the balance of his original debt and for interest on it, whether this 
be calculated to date of insolvency or to date of presentation of claim. 
Now we come to the question on what basis shall the claim of the 
secured creditor against the general assets be allowed? The so-called 
Bankruptcy Rule forces the secured creditor to realize his securities 
first and prove for the balance. On this balance he is to receive his 
dividends. The so-called Chancery Rule allows the secured creditor 
to receive dividends upon the original claim unreduced provided 
that he shall not in the aggregate receive more than the total amount 
of his debt or claim. 
We believe the Chancery Rule in insolvency and Receivership 
cases can not be upheld on equitable principles, although high au-
thority ~ be cited for upholding it.14 Under the Chancery Rule 
and under the rule refusing to calculate interest subsequent to ap-
pointment of receiver a secured claimant would present his claim 
against the general assets for the original amount with interest up 
to the time of insolvency anq appointment of receiver. Under the 
u Spring Coat Co. v. Keech (1goz), 239 Fed. 48. 1917 L. R. A. II52 and 
notes; Huff v. Bidwell (1914), 218 Fed. 6 at 9; F°U"st Nat. Bank v. Ewing, 
103 Fed. 168. · 
sau. S. cases supporting Chancery Rule are Chemical Nat. Bk. v. Arm-
strong, 16 U. S. App. 465. 59 Fed. 372- 8 C. C. A. 155, 28 L R. A. 231, 6s 
Fed. Si'3. 13 C. C. A. 4;r; Merrill v. Nat. Bank of Jacksonville (1898), 173 
. U. S. 131. See howe-nr Westinghouse Etec. & Mfg. Co. v. Idaho Ry. L. & P. 
Co. (1915), aa8 Fed. g;a. 
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Bankruptcy Rule he would present his claim for the balance due 
.after realization of his collateral with interest up to the time of ap-
pointment of receiver. 
Our idea of a true equitable and ratable distribution along what 
may be called scientific lines, would we believe, be to calculate the 
original claim with interest agreed upon. up to the time of making 
distribution, subtract from this the amount .realized from securities 
or collateral realized, and pay dividends upon the balance. 
INTt~T ON PRIORITY CI.AIMS 
W}len it has been determined that interest shall be allowed on 
ordinary claims secured by mortgage, pledge, etc., the next question 
which naturally presents itself ~s, shall interest -be allowed on claims 
which by statute or otherwise have precedence or priority over such 
secured claims? An ordinary lien is created by a contract between 
the parties. If that lien cont~ct covers interest on the obligations 
secured, then· interest must be ·added to the claim; if that contract 
does not include interest, then any claim for interest must be met 
out of general assets. Suppose however, the law either statutory or 
otherwi~e, says that public policy demands and law or equity recog-
nizes that ·certain claims when insolvency takes place shall be given 
priority even over ordinary secured claims. Take for instance claims 
for supplies secured by a lien which by statute takes priority over 
mortgages. Does such a statute giving priority to certain claims, 
cover interest on such claims? Of course, it is impossible to lay 
down a rule covering all statutes when· each separate statute may be 
worded di:ff erently from every other statute. In the first place, the 
appointment of a receiver has not created any claims, neither has it 
added to nor taken away from any claims. If a claim before re-
ceivership drew interest, its interest :))earing quality has not been 
taken away from it by appointment of a receiver. On the other 
hand," if a claim did not bear interest, the appointment of a receiver 
will not of itself make it interest-bearing. 
As to interest on claims secured by a lien which is given priority 
and which undoubtedly come within the case of American Iron Co. 
v. Seaboard Air Line, there seems to be little doubt. As to cases 
whe~ein the~e is no lien but only a priority declared by statute or by 
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the six months priority rule or by other usages and rules of equity, 
these cases present more difficulties. 
We have two very important Federal Appellate Court cases15 
wherein interest was allowed on claims for supplies which were pre-
ferred by the so-called six months' rule. In each of these cases there 
were enough funds to pay such supply claimants in full with inter-
est, without encroaching on the mortgage se~urity. . 
A case presents much greater difficulties wherein the holders of 
priority claims ask interest on the same, subsequent. to time of ap-
pointment of a receiver, and if such interest is paid it must be taken 
· out of the corpus of the estate and so reduce the amount .payable to 
th~ mortgage creditors. This situatio~ is fully discussed in the case 
of New York T. Co. v. Detroit T. & I. Ry. Co. (1918) 251 Fed. 514. 
The court in that case concedes that in his circuit the rule prevails 
that six months' claims are payable out of the earnings of the re-
ceivership, or even in a proper case, from the corpus of the com-
pany's property in preference to the mortgag~s foreclosed. The 
court concedes that the case before him (mainly supplies of railroad 
ties) comes under the .six months' rule, and in refusing interest cites 
as authority the case of Thomas v. Western Catt Co., 149 U. S. n6. 
The court, however, overlooks we believe, the fact that Mr. Justice 
Shiras in the Thomas case specifically makes the statement that the 
claim for car rentals 'did not come under supplies furnished from 
day to day and necessary for the maintenance of the road. Further-
more,_ the claim for interest in the Thomas case was attempted to be 
inflicted on the mortgagors as a penalty for resisting claims. This 
was refused. Since in the Thomas case the court refused to allow 
the car claims as six months priority claims at all, it is very difficult 
to apply what the court said concerning interest on those claims to a 
case like the N. Y. Trwt Co. case where the court actually concedes 
that the claims themselves come under the six months rule. 
Says Mr. Justice Lamar in Am. Iron Co. v. Seaboard Air Line 
when commenting on the Thomas case: 
"For manifestly, the law does not contemplate that either 
the debtor or the trustees can, by securing the appointment 
""Penn. Steel Co. v. N. Y. City Ry. Co. (1914), 216 Fed. 458 at 471; 
Texas Co. v. International & G. N. Ry. Co. (1918), 250 Fed. 742 at 14s. 
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of Receiver, stop the running of interest on claims of the 
highest dignity.'' 
This is true whether the mortgage claims are not paid. at all or 
,are paid in :Part or in full. The only justification of stopping pay-
ment of interest on claims at time of appointment, is because in 
cases of a deficiency of assets the cutting off of interest at time of 
appointment amounts to the same thing as adding it to claims of 
equal dignity and then in the distribution scaling these claims down 
below the original claims plus this interest added. In other words, 
as between claims of equal dignity and equal interest ·hearing quality-
it does not help to add a ce~ per cent and then have to take it off 
again for lack of funds. But this rule of interest does not apply as 
between claims of different dignities, because it does not work an 
equitable and ratable distribution. For instance, if $I,ooo and in-
terest is due on first mortgage claims, and $1,000 and interest is due_ 
on second mortgage claims, all other things being equal and we cut 
off the interest on ~e first mortgage_ claims, we are actually depriv-
ing the first mortgage holders of what they are entitled to by con-
tract of mortgage. If the contract of mortgage says so, this interest 
is covered by the pledge, and the court can not cut it out in favor of 
the second mortgagee·. Does it make any difference if the priority 
claimant bases his claim on a statute or usage and rule of equity 
rather than on a contract lien? Judge Sater in the N. Y. Trust Co. 
case, concedes that the six months claims have priority over the 
mortgage claims, but refuses to allow interest on the six months 
<:laims beyond the time of appointment of receiver. If Judge Sater's 
proposition is sound, which gives the six-months claims priority over 
mortgages, then we are unable to see why interest on these claims 
should not he given priority over the mortgages. If the supply 
claimants have their money used and tied up to keep up the mort-
gage security, they it would seem should be entitled to interest on 
the sapie, as well as· the mortgage security holders themselves are 
entitled to interest. If the policy of the law says that supply claim-
ants ~re and have added their property to the mortgagee's security, 
and the security covers interest on the mortgage debt, then the supply 
creditor has added his property and lost the earning power of. that 
property in order that the mortgage creditor may recover his debt 
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and also interest on same. We can not from the facts of the case oi 
N. Y. v. Detroit, distinguish it on principle from Am. Iron Co. v. 
Seaboard Air Line; Penn. Steel Co. v. N. Y. City Ry. Co_. and Texas 
Co. v. International G. N. Ry. Co., unless there were !aches or some· 
thing of the kind which was not brought out in the report of th<:. case. 
We are aware of a number of decisions holding as does Judge 
Sater, but we bel~ve these. decisions must give way to the principles 
as stated above and laid doWn in Am. Iron Co. v. Seaboard Air Line. 
A discretion as to allowing interest is allowed on matters of tort, 
Eddy v. Lafayette, 163 U. S. 456 at 467; De La Rama v. De La 
Rama (1915) 241 U.S. 154, at 159· However, in cases of contract 
or the unlawful detention of money interest is allowed as a matter 
of law. Lincoln v. Claflin (1868) 7 Wall., 132 at 139· If courts 
will, as a matter of law, allow interest on contract cl~ims and on the 
unlawful detention of money, does not a claim for payment of sup-
plies come under one or the other? If as a matter of law interest 
is recoverable on such a claim, it becomes part of the claim, and if 
this is so how can we separate the two and when the time of pay-
ment comes allow the original claim to be preferred ana not allow 
interest on.the same to ·be.preferred. · 
lNT£nsT ON JUDGM£NTS nND£RlU> SUBSF:Qt7£NT To nc£MRSHIP 
Outside of the law of receivers, a judgment will ordinarily include 
the principal sum due plus any interest up to the time judgment is 
rendered. If at the 'time a receiver is appointed a claim has not been 
reduced to judgment, the appointment of a receiver does not of it-
self stop the running of interest on that claim subsequent to the 
appointment of receiver. Neither does the appointment of a receiver 
of itself prevent a judgment being rendered against the defendant 
whose property has been placed in the hands of a receiver.16 If 
judgment is rendered ·against the defendant subsequent to the time 
of appointment of receiver, this judgment, like any other judgment, 
should be for the full amount of the claim plus interest up to the 
time of rendering judgment. This judgment does not become a lien 
on property in the hands of the receiver, neither can a levy or 
" Cr.ARK ON ~CEMRS, Vol. I, sec. ']67. 
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execution be issued against such propeity.17 A judgment in such a 
case is a liquidation of the claim and represents what the appoint-
ing court or another court has determined to be the amount of the 
claim. A judgment against a defendant whose property is in the 
hands o~ a receiver is a measure of the plaintiff's claim at the time 
the judgment is rendered, and as far as ~e amount of the judgment 
is concerned it makes no difference whether the defendant is solvent 
or insolvent. . 
When the owner of the judgment however, comes to present his 
judgment to the appointing court and demands payment out of the 
assets in the receiver's hands, then the appointing court before order-
ing distribution must determine whether or not the defendant is 
solvent and whether or not all proper claims can be paid in full. If 
insolvency· is found, then some or all claims must be scaled down. 
If the court can distribute equitably by ref using to consider interest 
after appointment of receiver, then a judgment rendered subsequent 
to appointment must be adjusted to its value at time of appointment 
of receiver. Payments are to be made on adjudicated claims; not on 
the amount due. upon the claims when adjudicated.18 When the ap-
pointing court comes to allow this adjudicated claim it will therefore 
determjne the value of this claim as of the time when insolvency 
occurred or at the time when distnoution is made according to the 
rule of interest which the distributing court adopts. 
INTEREST WHEN SOI.VtNCY IS SHOWN 
We have discussed at length the payment of interest in cases of 
insolvency and shown that insolvency and appointment of receiver 
does not take away the interest bearing quality of a debt, although 
it may be stopped at time of appointment in certain case~ where the 
stopping of it at this time will not militate against an equitable and 
ratable distribution of the assets. If the appointment of a receiver 
in some way did .stop the running of interest on claims, as some 
courts hold, then it would be difficult in theory to restore this interest 
bearing quality when solvency was determined. However, if the 
debt has never lost its interest bearing quality, then the showing of 
uCI.ARK ON IO:o:IvERs, Vol. I, sec. 766. 
21 White v. Knox (1883), III U.S. 784. 
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solvency not only recognizes the interest bearing quality of the debt, 
but in addition means that there are funds on hand sufficient to pay 
interest up to the time of payment. Although there are many. con-
tradictory decisions on tlie subject of interest when there is in-
solvency shown, nevertheless, the decisions are generally uniform in 
holding that when solvency is shown, debts' shall draw interest as 
if no receiver had been appointed.19 
Cincinnati, Ohio. RAr,PH E. Cr.ARK. 
'"See Note II, supra. 
